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Abstract: 
Reism or concretism are the labels for a position in ontology and semantics that 
is represented by various philosophers. As Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Jan 
Woleński have shown, there are two dimensions with which the abstract 
expression of reism can be made concrete: The ontological dimension of reism 
says that only things exist; the semantic dimension of reism says that all 
concepts must be reduced to concrete terms in order to be meaningful. In this 
paper we argue for the following two theses: (1) Arthu  Schopenhauer has 
advocated a reistic philosophy of language which says that all concepts must 
ultimately be based on concrete intuition in order to be meaningful. (2) In his 
semantics, Schopenhauer developed a theory of logicdiagrams that can be 
interpreted by modern means in order to concretize the abstract position of 
reism. Thus we are not only enhancing Jan Woleński’s list of well-known 
reists, but we are also adding a diagrammatic dimension to concretism, 
represented by Schopenhauer. 
Keywords: Semantics, Reism, Reification, Abstraction, Philosophy of 
Language, Logic Diagrams, Jan Woleński. 
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
In his article published in The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy on the doctrine of reism, Jan 
Woleński remarks that it has been anticipated by a number of philosophers from antiquity to 
modernity. The list includes names such as Thomas Hobbes, Gottfried Wilhelm Leibniz, and Franz 
105 
 
Brentano, and eventually points at the Polish philosopher Tadeusz Kotarbiński as the one who has 
presented the “most developed version” of the doctrine [31]. Kazimierz Ajdukiewicz and Woleński 
concretize the abstract concept of reism by dividing it into an ontological (only things are real) and 
a semantic dimension (concepts must be reduced to things) [1], [31]. In this paper, we argue (1) that 
the above-given list should be enhanced by the name of the philosopher Arthur Schopenhauer, who 
was born in Danzig in 1788 and died in Frankfurt in 1860, and who is for example known for 
having influenced Wittgenstein [18], [7]. Moreover, we argue not only for reism in Schopenhauer’s 
work but also for the fact (2) that in his Berlin Lectures of the 1820s Schopenhauer has developed a 
diagrammatic method of concretization. 
Argument (1) may seem quite unexpected, given the fact that Schopenhauer is known as a 
thinker who holds that the whole world is a manifestation of a metaphysical and irrational will [30, 
p. 34] – a stance that seems to be nowhere less than a  complete odds with e.g. Kotabiński’s reist 
program. To prove this not fully adequate, we will focus in Section 2 on Schopenhauer’s 
methodology and offer a reading of it which gives strong foundations for viewing him as a reist. In 
this section, we will also reconstruct the most important elements of his philosophy of language of 
his Berlin Lectures as, until recently, they have not drawn much attention among scholars.  
Argument (2) is addressed in Section 3. Here, we will develop a diagrammatic method that 
Schopenhauer used in his Berlin Lectures to illustrate his reistic doctrines. For Schopenhauer, logic 
diagrams are the best way to concretise what can normally only be expressed in abstract terms. 
Therefore, we argue that they can show another, namely diagrammatic dimension to understand the 
position of reism or concretism. These diagrams have already been introduced in [8] as a general 
tool for philosophy of language. Although the diagrammatic method has certain similarities to the 
diagram systems of e.g. Leonhard Euler, Immanuel Kant, nd even John Venn, we use the term 
“Schopenhauer diagrams” to avoid further clarifying the relationship to already known logic 
diagrams.  
 
2. Schopenhauer’s Reist Philosophy of Language 
 
In this section, we will first give an introduction to Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language (2.1), 
then present his theory of concepts (2.2), and finally argue that Schopenhauer’s theory can be called 
reistic (2.3). In this presentation (2.1 – 2.2) and rgumentation (2.3), we refer mainly to the writings 
from Schopenhauer’s Berlin period (1818 – 1830) and especially to his Berlin Lectures. 
 
2.1. Introduction to Schopenhauer’s Philosophy of Language 
 
§1 State of Research  
 
Despite the claim of Jan Garewicz, the Polish translator of, among others, The World as Will and 
Representation (WWR) that Arthur Schopenhauer’s philosophy “has found a strong resonance in the 
period of scientism and positivism” [10, p. 32], the German philosopher’s work on philosophy of 
language and logic seems to remain almost unknown t the researchers currently concerned with 
these topics. This might be somehow connected with the fact that it is in the manuscripts for his 
Berlin Lectures [23], [24], written in the 1820s, that he dedicates his attention to these issues in the 
most systematic and profound way. The lectures were until recently1 only available in an edition 
published over 100 years ago, during the ending of a period which might be considered the peak of 
interest for his philosophy2 [3, p. 13 f.]. However, it is not that Schopenhauer does not work on 
these topics in his other works. In fact, the topics of language and concepts appear in his writings 
throughout his career, starting from his dissertation (1813) until his final work Parerga and 
Paralipomena (1851), and seem to constitute an object of his reoccurring philosophical interest 
which plays an important role for his philosophical system [6, pp. 11-12]. 
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§2 Hierarchies of Language 
 
In a recent paper, Matthias Koßler argued that Schopenhauer’s theory of language cannot be simply 
reduced to a nominalist, instrumental theory, in which language is treated as a tool for describing 
empirical objects. However, Koßler admits at the end of his paper that “[n]evertheless 
Schopenhauer talks about language as a tool […]” and adds: “He [sc. Schopenhauer] does not reject 
these aspects of language but places them into a hier rchic order of different uses of language” [15, 
p. 23]. Without further discussion on whether the instrumental theory of language is the core or just 
one of several uses of language distinguished by Schopenhauer, it certainly is present in his analysis 
of language and, significantly for our purpose, it provides a framework which seems to concur with 
reism3.  
 
§3 Language within Schopenhauer’s System 
 
As the titles of his main work (The World as Will and Representation = WWR) and the more 
detailed Berlin Lectures (The Doctrine of the Essence of the World and the Human Spirit) suggest, 
Schopenhauer assumes that there are only two ways of knowing the world that can be attributed to 
humans – as representation and as will [25, p. 129], [ 4, p. 41]. Whereas the parts of his writings in 
which he discusses the world as will can be, broadly speaking, interpreted as the presentation of his 
metaphysics, the examination of the world as representation contains elements of his epistemology 
and methodology. Not surprisingly, Schopenhauer in both works quite early in the presentation of 
his system already discusses the problem of language and specifically the possibilities of 
application of concepts for the description of intutive and mental facts. This discussion can be 
found in the rather short paragraph 9 of the first volume of WWR (about 10 pages long) and is then 
significantly enhanced in the notes for Schopenhauer’s Berlin Lectures, which encompass more 
than 100 pages on language and logic. 
 
§4 Idealism and Empiricism 
 
The starting point for the construction of Schopenhauer’s system seems quite paradoxical. On the 
one hand, he assumes the Kantian, idealistic view that the “being of things is identical with their 
cognition” [Das Seyn der Dinge ist identisch mit ihrem Erkanntwerden] [23, p. 113], which he 
expresses in his claim that all the world is our representation (i.e. the world that we perceive is not 
the thing-in-itself). On the other hand, Schopenhauer sees the framework of the phenomenal world 
with its a priori forms of cognition as somehow the natural way of knowi g the world4 and the only 
possible foundation for any further philosophical and metaphysical investigations. He opposes any 
possibility of deducing the truth about the world from reason alone and instead makes the claim that 
any metaphysics should be founded upon the immanent experience of the subject or even „empirical 
sources of knowledge” [23, p. 152], cf. also [14, p. 363]. Thus, Schopenhauer simultaneously 
assumes (1) the idealist stance that empirical reality is a creation of the subject’s cognition and (2) 
the empiricist distinction of empirical sources and the subject’s knowledge. This is possible because 
he treats the empiricist dualism as the starting point f r the construction of a philosophical system, 
which eventually is monist. 
 
§5 Ontological and Epistemological Interpretation 
 
Consequently, the distinction of empirical sources and the subject’s knowledge should not be 
interpreted ontologically, but epistemologically. Schopenhauer does not claim that what is empirical 
is ultimately real. He only claims that we experienc  the subject-dependent phenomenal world as 
having two dimensions, namely intuitive objects and bstract thoughts, and this is the outlook we 
need to assume as the starting point for philosophical reflection, as from it we get out data for the 
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investigation of the world. We need to do so, even if we are philosophically aware of the idealistic 
character of human cognition.  
 
2.2. Schopenhauer’s Theory of Concepts 
 
§6 Two Classes of Phenomena 
 
According to §5, philosophical reflection sets off with considering the world as representation or a 
collection of representations (phenomena). These phenomena can be grouped into two classes: (1) 
intuitive and (2) abstract phenomena. The character of this classification is epistemological, as the 
reason for it is provided by the different modes of c gnition of both classes of representation: (1) 
intuitive representations are recognized by understanding [Verstand] [23, p. 207], (2) the abstract 
ones by reason [Vernunft] alone [23, p. 242]. “All our representations”, Schopenhauer says, “can 
generally be divided into visual [anschauliche] and merely thought-like [gedachte], intuitive 
[intuitiv] and abstract, into images and concepts” [23, p. 118]. As can be seen, this distinction is 
also equated with the differentiation of phenomena into “images” (which can be “seen”) and – 
significantly! – “concepts” (which can be “thought of”). Obviously, this must lead Schopenhauer to 
provide a solution to such questions as the characteristics of these two classes and their mutual 
relation. 
 
§7 Intuitions 
 
From a systematic point of view, intuitive phenomena are contrary to abstract phenomena. That is, 
if something is an intuitive phenomenon, it cannot also be an abstract phenomenon and vice versa. 
From a historical point of view, Schopenhauer dissociates from the theories of mere sensory data of 
ancient and modern rationalists and empiricists and dopts a reduced Kantian theory of intuition: 
the intuitive phenomena provide the material data which we can then express in terms of concepts. 
However, the reception of this data is conditioned by the form of space, time, and causality [23, p. 
57, cf. also pp. 146, 172], which allows us to experience, i.e. to absorb sensory data. Therefore, 
space, time, and causality are a priori valid and they generate the hic et nunc of intuitive 
representation. In the end, it seems plausible to assume that Schopenhauer understands intuitive 
representations as reality [Wirklichkeit] [23, p. 207] which is empirical and gives immediate, direct 
knowledge. However, we need not forget that this dualism between intuitive and abstract 
phenomena is only epistemological, but not ontological.  
 
§8 Concepts 
 
Concepts, the second class of phenomena, are characterized as “a very peculiar class of 
representations that exist alone in the human mind” and which are “toto genere different” from 
intuitive representations. This difference is expressed above all in the fact that concepts can only be 
thought of abstractly, but not observed in intuitive representation [23, p. 242]. In other words: 
concepts are not empirical, intuitive objects, but they are experienced by the subject as something 
like – using modern terminology – mental states. Furthermore, Schopenhauer holds that “every 
concept as a general, not a specific, representatio has what is called a sphere, a circumference”, 
which refers to a set of objects (both other concepts as well as real objects, see below) that can be 
conceived by it [23, p. 257]. 
 
§9 Abstraction and Concept 
 
How, then, are concepts made? Reason produces concepts by abstracting from the many properties 
of objects that are given in intuitive representation: The concept therefore contains less than the 
[intuitive, JL&MD] representation itself“; it is created by “seeing away from what is unique in the 
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individual [Wegsehn vom Besondern der Individuen]” [23, pp. 249, 252]. Thus, a concept “does not 
contain everything” that is given or contained in its intuitive basis. Because of this “innumerable 
intuitive objects” can be thought of with the help of a concept [23, p. 249]. On the basis of an 
intuitive representation an abstract, mental reconstruction of it can be formed, which is generally 
applicable to many other objects in intuitive representation. This generalization, which consists of 
the liberation from the hic et nunc of intuitive representation (§7), thus enables the mental grasp of 
abstract, past and future facts, and these in turn can become human motives for action.  
 
§10 Generality of Concepts 
 
Schopenhauer points out that the general applicabilty of concepts for intuitive representation is not 
the result of the process of development of concepts – i.e. abstraction from one or many intuitive 
objects or concepts (§9) – but it is a result of their substantial nature, i.e. their being merely mental, 
which is characterized by the absence of temporal-sp tial determinations. It is, therefore, possible 
and even necessary that a concept that has arisen by abstracting from properties of one single 
intuitively given object can potentially be applied to several objects [23, p. 256]. Schopenhauer 
says: “a concept is always general, even if there is only one thing that is thought by it; and only a 
singular intuition that gives it content, is a proof f it” [23, p. 276 f.].  
 
§11 Classes of Concepts 
 
Concepts, as abstract representations or thoughts, are also divided by Schopenhauer into two 
general classes, concreta and abstracta. Concreta are abstracted directly from intuitive 
representations, and abstracta are formed by abstracting from some characteristics of “concepts or 
genera [Gattungen]”. According to his examples, concreta are for instance red, dog, house, and 
abstracta: color, relation, friendship. He strongly reiterates that this classification is, strictly 
speaking, inauthentic or wrong, because all concepts are in fact abstract and only “what is intuitive 
is actually concrete” [23, p. 252]. By using the (inauthentic) terms concretum and abstractum he 
seems to refer to the original Latin meaning, where abstrahere stands for “taking away” (cf. 
Schopenhauer’s claim that all concepts are an effect o  a “seeing away” above) and concrescere for 
“growing together”. The classes are only helpful in u derstanding the relation of concepts to the 
empirical world. Schopenhauer uses an allegory: if we think all concepts that we have as a building, 
then the ground on which it stands will be intuitive representations, the ground floor will be 
concreta and the higher floors will be abstracta [23, p. 252]. The more general a concept is, the 
further away it is from empirical reality. 
 
§12 Intuition-Concept-Hierarchy 
 
By reference to the classes of concepts (§11), Schopenhauer claims an epistemological hierarchy, in 
which intuitive objects (§7) precede concepts as a source of knowledge. He also denies ay kind of 
innatism, i.e. the presence of a priori concepts in the human mind: “the whole abstract faulty of 
reason [sc. the conceptual] is a secondary one, which presupposes intuition” [23, p. 235]. The 
dependence of concepts on intuitive representations is a consequence of how he understands the 
process of the development of concepts, namely as “reproduction, repetition, of the archetypal 
intuitively given world” [23, p. 251]. Consequently, concepts become dependent on intuitive reality 
as the source of information or data that they contain (§9). This finds its expression for instance in 
the following quotation: “the whole world of reflection [...] rests on the intuitive one as its basis of 
cognition” [23, p. 252]. This is the reason, why Schopenhauer repeatedly refers to concepts as 
“representations of representations” [23, p. 249]. Concepts have meaning only in relation to 
empirical reality5 and the more abstract a concept is, the less meaning it has.6 
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2.3. Schopenhauer’s Reism 
 
§13 Reism 
 
This leads to the core claims of what could be called Schopenhauer’s reism. As has been shown, 
within his basic idealistic outlook (§4) he develops a theory of two types of cognition, intuitive and 
conceptual (§§6-8), and puts them into an epistemological hierarchy (§12), as he holds that concepts 
have meaning only in reference to empirical, intuitive objects, without which they would be 
nothing. But even more crucially, he also holds that concepts can be understood if and only if they 
can be referred back to intuitions. For a concept to be distinct and meaningful [deutlich], it must be 
possible to fill it with empirical content. The “common explanation that the concept is distinct if it
can be broken down into its characteristics is not enough” as long as these characteristics cannot be 
traced back to intuitive representation, i.e. to clear perceptions [23, p. 254 f.]. Schopenhauer 
concludes: “From our entire inquiry it has become evid nt to everyone that the origin of all 
knowledge and the foundation of all science lies in direct knowledge, that is, in intuition. Intuition 
is the last source of all truth: all abstractions, all concepts, are only substitutes and only for their 
other use, are they the substance of our knowledge; their truth is always an indirect one: the source 
of all evidence is intuition. All knowledge, all thinking, which does not eventually lead to some 
kind of intuition, is empty” [23, p. 539]. 
 
§14 Reist Language Criticism 
 
For Schopenhauer, we only have meaningful [deutliche] concepts if we are able to replace our 
abstract concepts with references to intuitive reality. It follows that we should be able to break 
abstracta down to concreta, so that concreta refer [hindeuten] to empirical reality [cf. 23, p. 254 f.]. 
This idea is also one of the foundations, if not the most important one, of his repeated criticism of 
Scholastics and German idealists, whose proponents are criticized for their abundant use of very 
abstract concepts [32]:  
 
“Especially in philosophy, the danger is great that one rises so high from abstraction to 
abstraction that the way back to intuitive phenomena [Rückweg zum Anschaulichen] is 
no longer to be found: then the whole knowledge is mpty: one operates with mere 
concepts that are no longer based on intuition: such knowledge is like paper-money that 
cannot be cashed anywhere”7 [23, p. 539].  
 
Obviously, Schopenhauer is criticizing here the improper use of language, and the problem, which 
he refers to, is that these philosophers’ terminology does not allow a clear reference to reality8 [4]. 
Putting it into reist terms: such abstract terminology cannot be reistically translated. 
 
§15 Kotarbinski’s Reism 
 
The stance that abstract concepts need to be broken dow  into concreta, which again can be 
referred back to intuition is strongly reminiscent of what Kotarbiński says about how a reist should 
proceed: “for every declarative sentence (statement) tha  includes abstract terms he tries to find an 
equisignificant statement including no such terms”. Also, definitions of abstract and concrete terms 
are provided: “By abstract terms I mean here all those which are not concrete, and by concrete I 
mean all, and only those, terms which are names of things” [16, p. 441]. This formulation of the 
reist program is almost identical to Schopenhauer’s language criticism and even uses similar 
terminology. However, one important difference should be pointed out. In Kotarbiński’s reism 
concreta are “names of things”. This seems to at least presum  the ontological statement that the 
world, which we conceptualize in language, consists of things. Indeed, soon after its presentation, 
Kotarbiński’s reism was subject to a debate regarding its interpretation as either (1) the ontological 
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claim that “every object is a thing” or (2) a semantic program which states that “every ‘name’ 
which is not a name of a thing” should be held “for an apparent name” [1, p. 610 f.]. It was also 
pointed out that ontological reism uses abstract terms for expressing its main theses and in 
consequence should be disqualified according to its wn rules [31]. After this criticism, Kotarbiński 
himself reformulated his reism into a semantic, normative program to free language from abstract 
names for clarity [31].  
 
§16 Between Ontological and Semantic Reism 
 
If we try to consider Schopenhauer’s language criticism according to this classification, it seems 
obvious that his postulate that we should be able to concretize abstracta and eventually refer 
concepts to intuitions can be interpreted as a semantic program (2) which formulates criteria how 
language should be used. It can indeed be understood as something quite similar to Kotarbiński’s 
semantic reism, as a “program with the aim of thorough ‘de-hypostatization’ of humanities” [or 
better: philosophy], with the goal of “turning it into a discipline which uses clear, simpler and more 
comprehensible language, even if less ‘sublime’ or ‘deep’” [33, p. 564 f.]. The question of whether 
Schopenhauer could be interpreted also as an ontologica  reist is more complex, given his steady 
claim about the idealistic character of representation (§4), which from a transcendental point of 
view denies the existence of things. 
 
§17 Epistemological Concretism 
 
For this reason, the distinction into ontological and semantic reism seems not appropriate for 
analyzing Schopenhauer’s reism. In fact, the crucial problem is that whereas in Kotarbiński’s reism 
concreta are “names of things”, Schopenhauer understands them as direct abstractions from 
intuitions (§13). It has to be underlined at this point that the original term for intuition which he 
uses is Anschauungen, which in German strongly connotes visuality, as cn be seen in §6, where 
abstract concepts are confronted with “images”. This re terates the fact that his understanding of the 
distinction into intuitions and concepts is epistemological and not ontological (§5). Thus it seems 
plausible to leave out the ontological question andinterpret his semantic reism from §16 as an 
epistemological claim, which could be reformulated as follows: “in order to be meaningful, abstract 
concepts have to be replaceable with concepts which can be intuited [or better in this context: 
visualized, ‘veranschaulichen’]”. Or more simply: in order to understand concepts we need to 
visualize them. This is strongly founded upon Schopenhauer’s axiomatic claim that all new 
knowledge lies in intuition [Anschauung] (§12) and that only intuition is truly concrete (§11). For 
this reason, the term “reism” seems inadequate and it is more suitable to refer to Schopenhauer’s 
doctrine as “concretism” – a term, which Kotarbiński used synonymously with “reism”. However, it 
should be specified that this is an epistemological, not an ontological concretism [31]. 
 
§18 Visualization 
 
To sum up, with recourse to [23, pp. 251-256], one could define the following claims of 
Schopenhauer’s epistemological concretism: (1) only the objects in intuitive representation are 
concrete; i.e. language is always abstract and only those terms are called (inauthentic) concreta that 
directly correspond to concrete intuition (§11). (2) If concepts are to be meaningful [deutlich], it 
must be possible to break them down into increasingly concrete concepts (§13), so that one can 
finally use these concrete concepts to indicate or to point to intuitive phenomena [hindeuten]. It 
follows that in order to make concepts comprehensible, we need a theory of visualization. And 
indeed, Schopenhauer makes several attempts to provide such theories for different fields. He does 
so e.g. for mathematics (cf. his visualization of the Pythagorean theorem, which he holds to be self-
explanatory [23, p. 425]) or for poetry [24, p. 317], but it is for the visualization of concepts and 
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language that he formulates the most developed theory in the Lectures. This theory is based on 
diagrams, which we discuss in Section 3. 
 
3. Schopenhauer Diagrams and Epistemological Concretism 
 
In this section, we will first give a short introduction to Schopenhauer diagrams (3.1), then develop 
a so-called level theory for concretism (3.2), with the help of which we can finally provide a tool for
Schopenhauer’s epistemological concretism, a semantic program in many ways similar to reism, in 
form of intuitive diagrams (3.3). 
 
3.1. An Introduction to Schopenhauer Diagrams 
 
§19 Schopenhauer’s Diagrams 
 
In his Berlin Lectures, Schopenhauer develops a diagrammatic logic that can be used to illustrate 
semantic positions, topics, and problems. The diagrams that Schopenhauer uses in his treatises on 
language, logic, and eristic are for him the most important method of concretizing abstract topics 
since diagrams intuitively illustrate what can only be formulated by using abstract concepts or signs 
[19]. For Schopenhauer, even abstract algebraic or conceptual theories of mathematics and logic 
must always be based on an intuitive representation that has an isomorphism to certain diagrams. 
Although Schopenhauer explains the function of logic diagrams in more detail [20], [5], he does not 
give precise rules for their application in philosophy of language. In what follows, we will sketch a 
theory of Schopenhauer diagrams based on four main principles (CI, PI, CE, PE) with which two 
diagrams given in Schopenhauer’s philosophy of langu ge (Fig. 1 and 2) can be analyzed and 
further developed. 
               
 
§20 Complete Sphere Inclusion (CI) 
 
Let us assume that in Fig. 1 we see a diagram that shows at least four terms in the form of four 
spheres. Two concepts are assigned to a CI, which is s own as a subset (⊆)9 in the diagram: (CI-1) 
The sphere that denotes the concept triangle is completely contained within the sphere of the 
concept figure, i.e. triangle	 ⊆ figure. (CI-2) The circle denoting the concept bird is completely 
contained within the sphere of the concept animal, i.e. bird	 ⊆ animal. In Fig. 2 we find no 
representation of CI. 
 
§21 Partial Sphere Inclusion (PI) 
 
PIs exist when two spheres have an intersection (∩) in the diagram. In Fig. 1 we find two PIs, since 
the two larger spheres are partially contained in the smaller spheres: (PI-1) The concept figure is 
partly contained in the sphere of triangle, i.e. figure	 ∩ triangle. (PI-2) The concept animal is partly 
contained in the sphere of bird, i.e. animal ∩ bird. In Fig. 2 we find even more PIs: (PI-3) The 
sphere that denotes the concept tree partially intersects the sphere of the concept green, i.e.     
tree	 ∩ green. (PI-4) Also green and flower-bearing intersect, i.e. green ∩ 	flower-bearing, and   
Fig. 1 (PL I, 258): Figur = figure; Dreieck 
= triangle; Thier = animal; Vogel = bird 
Fig. 2 (PL I, 257): grün = green; blüthetragend 
= flower-bearing; Baum = tree 
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(PI-5) flower-bearing and tree, i.e. flower-bearing	 ∩ tree. Furthermore, we see in Fig. 2 that PI can 
also occur with more than two terms, since (PI-6) the sphere of the concepts green, tree and flower-
bearing intersect in such a way that there is a common intersection in the middle of the diagram, i.e. 
green∩ tree∩ flower-bearing. 
 
§22 Complete Sphere Exclusion (CE) 
 
However, Fig. 1 also shows that two of the four spheres with the other two remaining spheres show 
neither CIs nor PIs (△): (CE-1) The sphere of the concept figure has neither CIs nor PIs with 
animal, i.e. figure△ animal; (CE-2) Due to (CE-1), (CI-1) and (CI-2) must also apply that triangle 
and bird possess neither CIs nor PIs, i.e. triangle△ bird. From (CE-1) and (CE-2) it is now also 
evident that one of the larger spheres with one of the smaller spheres has neither CIs nor PIs, i.e. 
(CE-3) figure△ bird and (CE-4) animal△ triangle. 
 
§23 Partial Sphere Exclusion (PE) 
 
PEs are present when CIs or PIs exist between two conceptual spheres, but a relative complement 
(∖) remains that is not described by CIs or PIs betwen these two concepts. In Fig. 1 we find two 
PEs, namely where the inside of the larger sphere is not covered by the smaller one, i.e. (PE-1) 
figure	 ∖ triangle and (PE-2) animal∖ bird. Since PIs were found in Fig. 2, we see here three PEs 
with two concepts: (PE-3) The sphere denoting the concept tree does partially not intersect the 
sphere of green, i.e. tree	 ∖ green. (PE-4) Also green and flower-bearing, i.e. 
green∖ 	flower-bearing, and (PE-5) flower-bearing and tree, i.e. flower-bearing ∖ tree. If one 
thinks about the union (∪) of all three spheres and subtracts (PI-6) from it, the result is one of 
several possible PE ratios including three concepts, i.e. (PE-6) (green∪ tree∪ flower-bearing) ∖
(green∩ tree∩ 	flower-bearing).  
 
§24 Relations 
 
Based on §§2-5 we can already establish some relations for the individual principles: For CI it is 
transitive, so that for all spheres 	, 
,  applies: If 	
	and	
, then		. For PI it holds that it 
is symmetrical so that for all spheres		, 
 holds: 	
	implies	
	. Also, CE is symmetric, so for 
all spheres 	, 
: 	
	implies	
	. For PE it is not symmetric, because for some spheres 	, 
 is 
valid (e.g. PE-1, PE-2): If		
, then not-
	. 
 
§25 Regions and Frames 
 
Concept development normally starts with only one sphere of a concretum (e.g. bird, animal), but 
in relation to other spheres they form new ones (e.g. PE-1: animal∖ bird). This is done by the four 
principles that form different regions (R) inside and outside a given conceptual sphere. In order to 
understand this concept formation more precisely, however, it is first necessary to examine the 
syntax of the respective diagrams with regard to the specific regions. These regions are marked in 
the diagrams D1 and D2, which structurally correspond to Figs. 1 and 2. To make it clear exactly 
what belongs to a diagram and what does not, we place a square frame (F) around the diagram. 
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§26 Semantics of Regions 
 
If we transfer the semantic meanings that we have gained in Fig. 1 and 2 with the help of the four 
principles to the syntactic designations of the regions in D1 and D2, we can make the following 
assignments. For Fig. 1 and D1: (CI-1) = {R1}; (CI-2) = {R3}; (PI-1) = {R2}; (PI-2) = {R4}; (PE-
1) = {R2}; (PE-2) = {R4}. For Fig. 2 and D2 it applies: (PI-3) = {R1, R2}; (PI-4) = {R1, R3}; (PI-
5) = {R1, R4}; (PI-6) = {R1}; (PE-3) = {R4, R5}; (PE-4) = {R6, R2}; (PE-5) = {R3, R6}; {R5} in 
D1 must also be present, otherwise (CE-1) and (CE-2) could not be displayed. But if we assume 
{R5} in D1, we must also consider {R8} in D2 to be useful, since both are constructed according to 
the PE principle: (figure	 ∪ animal) △  ={R5} in D1; tree∪ green∪ flower-bearing △  = {R8} 
in D2. 
 
3.2. A Level Theory for Concretism 
 
§27 Abstracta and Concreta 
 
For Schopenhauer, concepts are not uniform; rather, he distinguishes concepts into different levels, 
which are classified according to the degree of abstr ction or concretion. As described in §11, the 
reference to various levels is justified by the allegory of the building: Terms with different degrees 
of abstraction are assigned to different levels of the building. Although all terms are abstract, they 
can be divided (inauthentically) into abstracta and concreta. Since we will see below that the 
division into abstracta and concreta is too imprecise, we add a level degree for concepts Cs, in 
short: C-level, which is determined by the number of abstraction steps: 1st level C, 2nd level C, n 
level C.  
 
§28 Law of Reciprocity 
 
Each concept has a certain circumference and content [23, p. 258]. From a modern point of view, 
one can call the circumference the extension and the content the intension. Extension and intension 
of a concept (, ) stand thereby in an inverse relationship: The larger the extension of a 
concept, the smaller the intension and vice versa. If, for example,  can be described by a natural 
number 	 of a sequence from 0 to  (0,  ∶=			 ∈ ℕ"|	0	 ≤ 		 ≤ }), then &(	) =  − 	 applies 
to		. This relationship can be called the Law of Reciprocity, which became prominent through 
Kantian logic [11], [21]. If the number of C-level is known, then a suitable quantity can be given for 
 with the following formula:		 = 	number of C-levels	 − 	1. Let us take the following example: If 
we set the number of C-levels = 	6, then 	 = 	5. Furthermore,  	= 5, if  	= 0. If  	= 4, 
then  	= 1, etc. 
 
F F 
R1 
R2 
R3 
R4 
R5 
D1 
R1 R2 
R3 
R4 
R5 
R6 
R7 
R8 
D2 
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§29 Building Scheme 
 
With the building allegory given in §§11, 27 
we can now set up a scheme (Fig. 3) that 
illustrates the example of a Law of 
Reciprocity with 	 = 	5 given in §28. Due 
to the lack of space, the scheme is 
abbreviated between 2nd level C and 6th level 
C, as indicated by the dotted arrows. Here 
3rd level C ( 	= 2 and  	= 3), 4
th 
level C ( 	= 3 and  	= 2), 5
th level C 
( 	= 4 and  	= 1) are missing. At the 
very bottom is the object that is given in 
intuitive representation. All C levels are 
abstractions from intuitive representation. 
Therefore concepts are also called abstract 
representations or representations of 
representations (§§11, 12).  
 
§30 Abstraction and Concretion 
 
We see in the building scheme (Fig. 3) that between ach level processes of abstraction and 
concretization take place. If one takes up the modern istinction [9], [29] between objectual and 
conceptual abstraction (or concretion), one can also make a corresponding classification of 
processes, as can be seen in Fig. 3. Only for conceptual abstraction and concretion applies the Law 
of Reciprocity (§28): If conceptual concretion takes place, C loses a degree of extension but gains a 
degree of intension. In the case of conceptual abstr ction, C gains a degree of extension but loses a 
degree of intension. Note that the sequence from 0 to  (§28) is a degree and does not indicate the 
actual number of given objects. Since concepts are always general (§10), we can only indicate the 
degree of the relation between  and , but never the exact number of possible objects 
designated by C. 
 
§31 Designations of C-levels 
 
By the building scheme (Fig. 3) it is well recognized that being-abstract and being-concrete are in 
most cases relative designations: A term has a relativ  bstraction and concretion if it has a C-level 
above and a term below it. For example, a 2nd level C is more abstract compared to 1st level C, but 
more concrete compared to the 3rd level C. In such cases we speak of Abstract-Concrete Concepts 
or ACC for short. In our example (§§28 et seq.) 1st and 5th level C are no ACCs, because they have 
no C-level either below or above. Thus, we can call a 1st level C as a Bottom-Level Concretum or 
BLC and 5th level C a Top-Level Abstractum or TLA. These designations cannot only be justified 
diagrammatically but also by using the degrees of  and . For TLA,  	=  and  	= 0; 
for BLC,  	= 0 and  	= ; and for all ACC,  and  must be > 0 and < .  
 
§32 Concept and Object 
 
According to §§9, 30, a concept is an objectual abstr ction of certain objects given in intuitive 
representation. According to the building scheme (§26), this definition applies directly to a BLC or 
1st level C, while all other concepts on a higher C-level are abstractions from the lower C-levels, i.e. 
conceptual abstractions (§30). A concretion of a concept at a higher C-level (ACC and TLA) can 
therefore only be achieved by its reduction to a BLC or 1st level C. What this concretion of BLCs 
might look like, however, is only indicated in Schopenhauer’s work: One can say that that objectual 
1st level C 
Object 
2nd level C 
6th level C 
 	= 0 
 	= 1 
 	= 5  	= 0 
 	= 4 
 	= 5 
Conceptual
Concretion
Conceptual 
Abstraction 
Objectual 
Abstraction 
Conceptual 
Abstraction 
Conceptual
Concretion
Objectual
Concretion
Fig. 3 Building Scheme 
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concretion is made for instance through deictic references (“Hindeuten”, §14) accompanying speech 
acts.10 For example, pointing to a certain object when using BLCs such as red, dog, or house (§11) 
may be an act of concretion. Anyway, we have represent d objectual concretion and abstraction by 
a simple line in Fig. 3 to illustrate the differenc to conceptual concretion or abstraction illustrated 
by arrows. 
 
3.3. Concretion of Concretism with Schopenhauer Diagrams 
 
§33 A Level Theory for Schopenhauer Diagrams 
 
But how can the level theory established in Section 3.2 be applied to the Schopenhauer diagrams 
outlined in Section 3.1? A key to this attempt of making concretism more concrete with the help of 
a diagrammatic dimension is to focus on the etymological meaning of abstraction and concretion 
(§11) and its isomorphism with the four principles of Schopenhauer diagrams, i.e. PI, CI, PE, CE 
(§§ 20-23). In the following, we assume that the I-principles PI and CI correspond to concretion, 
but the E-principles PE and CE to abstraction. This can be seen in the design of Schopenhauer 
diagrams since in the case of I-principles spheres g ow together (concrescere), whereas in the case 
of E-principles they are subtracted from each other (abstrahere). 
 
§34 Definitions 
 
We now use the Law of Reciprocity (§§12, 28) and say: The more a region (§§25-26) is restricted 
by I-principles (∩,⊆), the higher is the degree of intension () and the more concrete is the 
concept. But the more a region is defined by E-principles (△,∖), the higher the degree of extension 
()	and the more abstract the concept. We further define that the C-principles have a higher 
concretion (CI) or abstraction (CE) than the P-principles (PI, PC), if the concepts determined by 
them are related in one diagram. 
 
§35 First Example: D1 
 
In D1, according to §26, we find five regions that c n be described by all four principles. By 
referring to §22, we see that the regions {R1}, {R2}, {R3}, and {R4} are in a balanced CE ratio: 
Each of these four regions is completely excluded from two others. Thus, for {R1}, {R2}, {R3} and 
{R4}, the level degree cannot be determined by CE. According to §26, this does not apply to {R5}: 
Since {R5} = (figure	 ∪ animal) △  and since	triangle	 ⊆ figure (CI-1) and bird	 ⊆ animal (CI-2), 
according to the transitivity-relation of CI (§24) it applies that {R5} = (triangle	 ∪ bird) △ . Thus 
{R5} is completely excluded from all other conceptual spheres. {R1} and {R3} must be considered 
as 1st level C or BLC according to the definitions given in §34 since they are the only conceptual 
spheres to which CI principles can be applied (see CI-1 and CI-2 above). For {R2} and {R4}, they 
partly exclude and partly include terms, i.e. (PI-1) = {R2}; (PI-2) = {R4}; (PE-1) = {R2}; (PE-2) = 
{R4} (§23). 
 
§36 Evaluation of D1 
 
Let us summarize the results of §35. For {R5} is completely excluded from all other conceptual 
spheres, {R2} and {R4} are partially included, parti lly excluded, but {R1} and {R3} are 
completely included, then applies: {R5} = TLA (3rd level C), {R2} and {R4} = ACCs (2nd level C), 
{R1} and {R3} = BLCs (1st level C). So since D1 denotes 3 C-levels, it makes sense to set  = 2 
(§25) and determine that for {R5}  	= 2 and  	= 0, {R2} as well as {R4}  	= 1 and 
 	= 1, and {R1} as well as {R3}  	= 0 and  	= 2 applies.  
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§37 Second Example: D2 
 
According to §26, we find eight regions in D2 that c n be described by three principles, i.e. PI, PE, 
and CE. Furthermore, §26 says that the only CE region is {R8}, which is excluded from all other 
regions, i.e. tree	 ∪ green	 ∪ flower-bearing △ . The regions {R5}, {R6}, {R7} are each formed 
by two PE and one PI, e.g. {R6} = (green∖ tree) ∩ (green∖ flower-bearing). The regions {R2}, 
{R3} and {R4} are each formed by one PI and one PE, e.g. {R2}	= (green∩ tree) ∖
flower-bearing. {R1}, however, is constructed without E-principles, only by PI, e.g. green∩ tree∩
flower-bearing. 
 
§38 Evaluation of D2 
 
Let us summarize the results of §37. For {R8} is completely excluded from all other spheres of 
concepts, {R5}, {R6} and {R7} are partly included, partly excluded, but {R1} is partly included by 
all spheres, then applies: {R8} = TLA (4th level C), {R5}, {R6} and {R7} = ACC (3rd level C), 
{R2}, {R3} and {R4} = ACC (2nd level C) and {R1} = BLC (1st level C). So since D2 denotes 4 C-
levels, it makes sense to set  = 3 (§28) and determine that for {R8}  	= 3 and  	= 0, for 
{R5}, {R6} and {R7}  	= 2 and  	= 1, for {R2}, {R3} and {R4}  	= 1 and  	= 2 
and for {R1}  	= 0 and  	= 3 applies.  
 
§39 Concretization 
 
According to §13, there must be a way back to intuitive phenomena in D1 and D2 if concepts are 
meaningful [deutlich]. In D1 this means a way back to the two BLCs, either {R1} or {R3}. In D2 a 
reduction to {R1} is required. For {R1} in D1, for example, we can say that it is a BLC to which 
not only the concept figure but also triangle applies. In {R1} in D2 we can say that the BLC 
designates an object that can be described with the expressions green, tree, and flower-bearing. All 
terms or regions in D1 and D2 which are connected with at least one BLC by an I-principle can be 
traced back. 
 
§40 Top-Level Abstracta 
 
However, TLAs cannot be traced back to BLCs as theyar  associated with all other terms by the 
CE-principle. TLAs are therefore characterized by the fact that they are negations of all other terms 
that are marked in a diagram. From {R8} in D2, for example, we know that it denotes all objects 
that are not green, not a tree, and not flower-bearing. The amount of objects that it denotes is 
immeasurable, especially when compared to the objects that are trees, or that are trees and bear 
flowers, etc. But other than on-tree, non-green and non-flower-bearing, we know nothing of {R8} 
in D2. For Schopenhauer, these TLA are not meaningful [deutlich], since there are no positive 
characteristics. Its extension is very high, but its intension is completely low. Because of the only 
negative relation to all other concepts in the diagram, a TLA can therefore not be traced back to a 
concretum, BLC or intuitive representation. According to the r istic criterion (§14) TLAs are 
therefore only confused [verworren], [23, p. 255] or meaningless words. 
 
4. Summary and Outlook 
 
In Section 2, we have presented Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language and in particular his theory 
of concepts as given in the Berlin Lectures. It has been shown that Schopenhauer’s theory of 
concepts can be described as reistic in the widest s nse: Without intuitive representations, there 
would be no abstract representations, so all meaningful abstracta must be reduced to concreta, 
which indicate to intuitive representations. Reism tself, however, is a concept that remains abstract 
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if it is not concretized, as e.g. Jan Woleński does, by pointing out an ontological and a semantic 
dimension. For Schopenhauer’s theory, however, the distinction into ontological and semantic reism 
seems not appropriate. Rather, it seems to make sens  to call his approach epistemic concretism due 
to the role of concreta and their relationship to concrete representation. ‘Concretism’, however, is a 
term, which Kotarbiński used synonymously with ‘reism’ therefore the choi e of words to describe 
Schopenhauer’s theory plays only a minor role. Much more important is that Schopenhauer 
introduces a further dimension that helps to understand his reistic or concretistic philosophy of 
language: Schopenhauer uses diagrams to concretize the degrees of abstraction and concretion of 
concepts and their relationship to the intuitive representation. We have introduced and discussed 
this diagrammatic dimension of his philosophy of language in Section 3. 
However, research on Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language and Schopenhauer diagrams 
is still in its infancy: As already indicated in §§15 et seq., for example, we have not yet been able to 
elaborate on all dimensions involved in Schopenhauer’s reism. A more precise attempt at 
clarification, which we cannot undertake in this paper, would have to discuss, for example, the role 
of phantasm as a possible reference point of c ncreta (§32), but also take into account 
Schopenhauer’s idealistic-transcendental philosophical position with regard to intuitive phenomena. 
Furthermore, we have reduced Schopenhauer’s philosophy f language here to an instrumental 
theory (§2). We have also ignored certain contextualist pproaches in Schopenhauer’s Berlin 
Lectures. 
However, in connection with Schopenhauer’s concretism, there are many more historical 
and systematic questions for future research: Largely unexplained is Schopenhauer’s influence on 
the philosophers and logicians of the early 20th century mentioned in §1. Furthermore, it can be 
assumed that Schopenhauer’s philosophy of language could be made clearer in a critical 
comparison with other prominent reists such as Brentano or Kotarbiński. Furthermore, the question 
remains open whether Schopenhauer’s criterion of reist language philosophy also does justice to the 
controversial concepts of his own theory, e.g. the will, Platonic idea, etc.  
Finally, research on Schopenhauer’s logic diagrams is also in its infancy: Since Schopenhauer 
formulated principles of diagram use mainly for theory of judgement, but not for the philosophy 
of language, other further interpretations, developments, and applications of his diagrams are 
conceivable. Of course, the results presented here should also be applied to more complex diagrams 
that have more than four spheres and where all princi les are involved. Furthermore, the question 
arises as to the relationship of Schopenhauer diagrams to historical ones, e.g. Euler, Kant, Krause, 
Venn, Peirce diagrams, or to modern systems of diagrams in semantics or logic. This raises the 
question of which ‘observable advantages’ Schopenhauer diagrams have and which principles and 
notations are best suited to describe them [28], [2]. In this paper, however, it was our sole aim to 
show Schopenhauer’s reistic position in his Berlin Lectures and its concretization through 
Schopenhauer diagrams.  
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Notes 
                                                          
1. A slightly modified re-print was published by Volker Spierling in 1984ff. A new edition of the 
lectures by Daniel Schubbe is currently being published at Felix Meiner Verlag. The publication of 
the part containing Schopenhauer’s considerations on language and logic is currently scheduled for 
December 2020. An English translation does not yet exist. 
2. Beiser points out that the interest in Schopenhauer peaked between the years 1860 and 1914. 
Significantly, this is also a period in which the founding texts of modern philosophy of language 
appear. Whether there is any relation between these two facts, however, needs further examination, 
even if it has already been pointed out that Schopenhauer’s philosophy had an impact on 
Wittgenstein [18], and there is an obvious reception of Schopenhauer in Logical Positivism (e.g. 
Béla Juhos wrote his PhD-thesis on Schopenhauer [12] and Moritz Schlick lectures on 
Schopenhauer [22]) and in the Lvov-Warsaw School (e.g. Schopenhauer was quoted at various texts 
of Kazimierz Twardowski and Kotarbiński wrote the introduction to the Polish translation f 
Schopenhauer’s Eristic Dialectic [17]). 
3. In this respect, Kotarbiński is very precise: “Thus it is obvious that reism, or concretism, is a 
variation of nominalism” [16, p. 442]. 
4. In his Lectures he states for example that this is the way of knowi g the world by the 
“philosophically crude” people, who have not yet philosophically reflected upon the world [23, p. 
463]. 
5. In his Berlin period, Schopenhauer found the term “natural education” for this, by which he 
postulated that empirical experience precede abstract knowledge [26, p. 260; 27, pp. 562-563]. 
6. For a more detailed explanation of this, encompassing some terminological problems of 
Schopenhauer’s theory, see [7, p. 33 ff.] 
7. It has to be pointed out here that Kotarbiński uses a very similar allegory of paper-money in 
reference to abstract concepts and their role in the reist outlook: “Every banknote, cheque, and 
promissory note must be exchangeable into gold on demand, which does not mean that all payments 
are made in gold” [16, p. 444]. 
8. Interestingly enough, the founder of the Lvov-Warsaw School, Kazimierz Twardowski, also 
formulated such criticism of German Idealism [13, p. 162]. 
9. Schopenhauer diagrams are not diagrams of set theory, but nevertheless the notation of set theory 
is suitable for describing Schopenhauer diagrams. In contrast to naïve set theory, however, we 
normally assign only one principle, and thus one set-th oretical sign, to each relation of two 
diagrammatic elements. A detailed study of the notation of Schopenhauer diagrams is planned for 
the future. 
10. Schopenhauer assumes that there are also other possibilitie , e.g. though phantasms [6, p. 43 
ff.].  
